Thursday, April 10, 2014

More on Stuxnet

I just ran across this excellent article on Stuxnet in, of all places, Foreign Policy magazine. It contains the best technical overview of Stuxnet that I've seen so far.

Friday, March 14, 2014

More on DARPA SHIELD

I attended a meeting today on the DARPA SHIELD program where I learned a lot about the problems of assuring the integrity of electronic hardware.  Counterfeit parts are a major concern for the U. S. military and a growing concern for companies.  The SHIELD program will develop a tag with a unique ID that can be attached to all sorts of electronic components.  The tag chip will be designed to
resist efforts to examine or alter it.

Counterfeit parts are widespread and come from a variety of sources.  False designs that contain Easter eggs designed to activate at a later date and cause problem are just one of the concerns.  A lot of fake chips are recycled from old, recycled electronics; ironically, much of that recycled gear comes from U. S. consumers.  Other fakes were made by the manufacturer but didn't pass all their tests for performance, temperature, etc.  The entities that sell these chips range from mom-and-pop operations to sophisticated criminal organizations to countries.  Some of the counterfeiters just want to make money while others are intent on harming the United States.

Interestingly, DARPA thinks that some of the most serious threat comes not from the high-end components but from simpler, commodity parts.  If your Ethernet chip goes bad, it can cause just as much problems as a bad high-performance CPU.  And intermittent failures, which are common in counterfeits, are harder to debug and trace to the part causing the problem.

Electronic parts have very long, complex supply chains.   All it takes is one slip-up anywhere along that path to allow bad parts to slip into the sytsem. Paperwork on the sources of components isn't enough.  The SHIELD program could make a big change in how we think about manufacturing and using electronics.

Friday, March 7, 2014

DARPA SHIELD Program

DARPA has announced a new program on hardware assurance; here is the DARPA press release.  The SAE AS5553A standard, which we have discussed before in this blog, defines documentation procedures used to keep track of hardware provenance.  SHIELD is a much more automated approach to this problem.

The SHIELD program aims at designing a small chip that can be affixed on components.  A handheld device can then be used interrogate the device and verify that the tag identifies the proper device.   The device is designed to be cheap---less than a penny---and to be resistant to tampering.

DARPA lists several thread models that are of interest to them: recycled components sold as new; unauthorized overproduction of authorized components; substandard components sold as new; parts remarked with higher reliability or newer manufacturing dates; out-and-out copies; parts that are repackaged and destined for unauthorized applications.

Wednesday, February 5, 2014

Wall Street Journal Reports on Power Substation Attack

Today's Wall Street Journal leads with an important article on a terrorist attack on an electric power substation.  When I started to read the article, I wondered if they were describing an exercise or simulated attack.  They weren't.  A team of terrorists attacked a PG&E substation in Silicon Valley.   They cut communication lines, then used rifle shots to puncture the transformer vessels and drain them of their cooling oil.  The transformers promptly overheated.  The terrorists got away just before the police arrived.  Whoever did it was well-trained---their rifle cartridges didn't have fingerprints.

This attack is disturbing on a number of levels, of course.  One cyber-physical angle is that, although this was primarily a physical assault, they also attacked the communication links into the substation as preparation.  It appears that communication was at least close to being a single point of failure in the system.  Monitoring the status of communication clearly helps with terrorist attacks such as these and it can also help contain other types of non-malicious faults.

I commend the Wall Street Journal for bringing this event to the public's attention.

Thursday, January 30, 2014

Privacy and Security

Security is a big focus in personal, server, and embedded computing.  Computer security or cybersecurity broadly refers to all sorts of information security.  We often focus on malicious attacks but good computer security offers protection against natural events as well.

Privacy is a related but distinct issue.  Computer privacy refers to what others can find out about us.  This of course includes what we tell the world and what information about us the bad guys can steal from our computers.  But privacy also includes what can be inferred from our data.  In a lot of cases, our agreement to release one kind of data allows others to infer more about us.

A good cyber-physical example of the nature of privacy is offered by your electric meter.  Your electric utility reads your meter periodically to bill you for the electricity you use.  But those meter readings tell more about what you do.  With even sparse electricity readings, such as the typical monthly reading, an observer can estimate the number of people living in your house.  I have heard rumors that some authoritarian regimes use just this technique to find people hiding in homes.  With more frequent readings, an observer could tell when you are likely to be away from the house.  This is the cyber-physical equivalent of the old thieves' trick of driving by to find houses with no lights, then targeting those houses for burglaries.

As we install more cyber-physical systems and IoT devices, we will create new privacy problems for ourselves.  Some of these are variations on old-world privacy issues; other problems are relatively novel.  Hopefully, we can roll out these systems so that we don't create long-lasting privacy holes that society can't easily plug.

Wednesday, January 29, 2014

More on IoT Security

Semiwiki.com has a number of interesting posts on the semiconductor industry and chip design.  Two recent posts address the intersection of chip design and the Internet-of-Things:
  • Don Dingee described a technique for modifying one-time programmable keys.  He makes the very good point that a lot of devices whose data is identified with us may be sold or transferred, creating a potential security and privacy problem.
  • Pawan Fangaria talks about the importance of MEMS sensors for IoT and discusses MEMS design techniques.

Sunday, January 26, 2014

Internet of Things security

Proofpoint, a computer security company, has confirmed what we long suspected: Internet-of-things devices pose computer security threads.  Their article, which you can find here, describes how they found a variety of household Internet-connected devices were sending out malicious emails.  The offending devices included multimedia devices and "at least one refrigerator."

 The idea of refrigerators as sleeper agents or Skynet nodes may sound like a Saturday Night Live sketch, but this observation has some serious implications.  PC security, while far from perfect, is much better than it was 20 years ago.  IoT devices are at a primitive level, but unlike PCs, consumers often have no reason to worry about them.  Malware on PCs may be used to attack other computers, but everyday users understand the very real threat to their data that is posed by these programs.  As a result, consumers are willing to invest in computer security tools.  So long as malware on IoTs is used to attack other computers without seriously affecting the device, consumers are unlikely to care much that their refrigerator has become a zombie.  And the market for these devices is sufficiently cost-sensitive that manufacturers are unlikely to introduce strong security measures on their own.  Like so many things, it may take a disastrous event to wake people up to the problem.